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INTRODUCTION
On August 22, 2007, the four biggest banks in the country—
Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan, and Wachovia—each
borrowed $500 million directly from the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.1 At the time, observers saw the move as largely symbolic
—a coordinated attempt by the Federal Reserve System (Fed) and
these major financial institutions to remove preemptively the
stigma associated with borrowing from the discount window.2
Within a month, borrowing from the discount window rose to the
highest level since the day after the September 11 terrorist attacks.3
As the financial crisis unfolded, the Fed continued lending, and by
August 2009, its balance sheet approached $2.08 trillion.4
Public and private interests clashed as the Fed refused to disclose
information regarding these transactions, such as the identities of
the borrowers, the amount of the loans, and the collateral accepted
in return.5 As a result, in the midst of the financial crisis and this
unprecedented level of Federal Reserve lending, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York heard two cases,
involving the Bloomberg and Fox News media outlets, seeking to
gain information regarding the Fed’s lending practices pursuant to
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).6 In both cases, the Fed
rejected the requests on the basis that the information was exempt
1. Eric Dash, Four Major Banks Tap Federal Reserve for Financing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23,
2007, at C10.
2. Id. For a discussion of the discount window and the mechanics of Federal Reserve
lending, see infra Part I.A.
3. Sudeep Reddy, Banks Flock to Discount Window—Borrowing Surge Comes as
Reduction Is Expected in Fed’s Overnight Rate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2007, at A2.
4. See Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of
Federal Reserve Banks (Aug. 27, 2009), available at http://federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/
20090827/.
5. See Mark Pittman, Bob Ivry & Alison Fitzgerald, Fed Defies Transparency Aim in
Refusal To Disclose (Update2), BLOOMBERG, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aOngFPgq7r3M.
6. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639
F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
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from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 4,7 which exempts from dis-
closure “commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential.”8 The opposite conclusions reached by
the two courts9 are representative of the divergent approaches
courts have taken in their attempt to understand the word “confiden-
tial.”10
The ruling of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, endorsing the
narrow view of confidentiality taken by the district court in
Bloomberg, failed to resolve this problem.11 The interpretation of
confidentiality that the Second Circuit endorsed is narrow because
it views the two-pronged test for confidentiality as exclusive.12 The
program effectiveness test, by contrast, allows an agency to with-
hold information in situations in which the disclosure of information
that serves a valuable purpose and is useful for the performance of
statutory duties would disadvantage the agency.13 This approach
espouses a broad view of confidentiality because it adds a third
prong to the otherwise dichotomous test.14
7. See Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (“The denial letter also reiterated that ... the
Board considered [the responsive documents] exempt under Exemptions 4 and 5.”); Fox News,
639 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (“The Board ... replied that all the documents that Fox had sought
were exempted from required disclosure rules under ... Exemptions 4 and 5.”).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (emphasis added).
9. Compare Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (finding that the information is not
confidential), with Fox News, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 400 (finding that the information is
confidential).
10. Compare, e.g., Nat’l Cmty. Reinv. Coal. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 290 F. Supp. 2d
124, 133-34 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding information confidential only if it is likely to impair the
government’s ability to obtain future information or is likely to cause competitive harm to the
original information provider), with Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Nat’l Insts. of
Health, 209 F. Supp. 2d 37, 46 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding information confidential in part because
disclosure would impair “the efficient and effective performance” of the government’s duties).
11. See Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 150-51
(2d Cir. 2010). A clearinghouse representing the banks as reverse-FOIA plaintiffs filed a
petition for certiorari against which the Fed filed a brief in opposition. See Brief for the
Federal Respondent in Opposition, Clearing House Ass’n v. Bloomberg, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 1674
(2011) (No. 10-543), 2011 WL 601152; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Clearing House, 131 S.
Ct. at 1674 (No. 10-543), 2010 WL 4232635. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari.
Clearing House, 131 S. Ct. at 1674. 
12. For a discussion of the two-pronged test and the test’s development, see infra Part
III.A.
13. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B.
1090 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1087
This Note argues that given the legislative history and underlying
purposes of FOIA, the program effectiveness test rejected by the
Second Circuit is a proper approach to interpreting the statutory
meaning of the word “confidential.”15 Furthermore, an examination
of the costs and benefits of the disclosure of financial information
that would affect an agency’s performance of its statutory duties
justifies overcoming FOIA’s default presumption in favor of dis-
closure. Part I of this Note discusses the factual background of the
Second Circuit cases, including the relevant details of the financial
crisis, the mechanics of Federal Reserve lending, and the informa-
tion sought in FOIA requests. Part II examines the legislative
history of FOIA to show that the program effectiveness test protects
specific congressionally contemplated interests. Part III traces the
development of Exemption 4 jurisprudence and analyzes the organic
development of the program effectiveness test. Part IV rejects the
Second Circuit’s comparison of the program effectiveness test to the
discredited “public interest” doctrine and proposes that the broad-
ness of the program effectiveness test is not only permissible but
also proper. Part V suggests that courts adopt a modified version of
the existing program effectiveness test—one that incorporates a
balancing test—in order to give the courts the ability to prevent
agencies from arbitrarily withholding information.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Financial Crisis and Federal Reserve Lending
The financial crisis has complex and multifaceted roots,16 with the
collapse of the subprime mortgage industry commonly considered
15. It is worth noting that academic literature has largely ignored the question of
interpreting “confidential” as the term is used in Exemption 4. Despite the long history of
courts grappling with the proper approach to this problem, see infra Part III, academic
commentary is limited to a handful of student-authored pieces and a small number of articles
in the Administrative Law Review. See, e.g., Sarah W. Carroll, Secrecy, Systemic Risk, and
the Freedom of Information Act’s “Confidentiality” Exemption 4 (Aug. 20, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662687 (“[A]cademic literature appears
to have ignored [this question] thus far.”).
16. For a discussion of the origins of the financial crisis, see generally HOWARD DAVIES,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: WHO IS TO BLAME? (2010); RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF
CAPITALISM 1-40 (2009). 
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the proximate cause.17 The Fed became involved in response to the
imminent failure of numerous significant financial institutions.18
The first financial institution to collapse was Bear Stearns in March
2008.19 September 2008 saw the nationalization of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac,20 the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,21 and the Fed’s
bailout of the American International Group.22
The Fed acts pursuant to authority granted by the Federal
Reserve Act (FRA).23 One of the Fed’s primary duties is to serve as
a lender of last resort and lend to “any individual, partnership, or
corporation ... unable to secure adequate credit accommodations
from other banking institutions.”24 The discount window operates to
provide two types of credit: primary credit, which is available to
depository institutions “in generally sound financial condition,”25
and secondary credit, which is available to depository institutions
17. See DAVIES, supra note 16, at 25-34 (discussing the subprime mortgage collapse as a
“trigger” of the greater financial crisis).
18. See Edmund L. Andrews, Vast Bailout by U.S. Proposed in Bid To Stem Economic
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A1.
19. See Landon Thomas, Jr., Run on Big Wall St. Bank Spurs U.S.-Backed Rescue, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A1 (describing the series of events leading to the collapse of Bear
Stearns as tantamount to a bank run). JPMorgan quickly bought Bear Stearns, with the Fed
acting as a facilitator in the process. See Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by
Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 480-83
(2009).
20. See James R. Hagerty, Ruth Simon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Seizes Mortgage
Giants—Government Ousts CEOs of Fannie, Freddie; Promises up to $200 Billion in Capital,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at A1.
21. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 19, at 491-94. For a first-person account of the
working of Lehman Brothers and the personalities involved in its operation and collapse, see
generally LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD WITH PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF
COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 298-339 (2009).
22. See Matthew Karnitschnig, Deborah Solomon, Liam Pleven & Jon E. Hilsenrath, U.S.
To Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout; Central Banks Inject Cash as Credit Dries, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 17, 2008, at A1.
23. Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.). The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), has significantly changed the operation of the
Federal Reserve System in response to the financial crisis and in numerous instances has
amended the FRA. However, as the purpose of this Part is to describe the Fed’s actions during
the financial crisis in order to provide context to the subsequent FOIA litigation, other
changes will not be discussed. 
24. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
25. 12 C.F.R. § 201.4(a) (2010).
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“not eligible for primary credit.”26 Since the passage of the Monetary
Control Act of 1980,27 access to the discount window has been open
to both member and nonmember institutions.28 Although loans must
be “secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank providing the
credit,”29 banks have broad discretion to determine what constitutes
acceptable collateral.30 During the financial crisis, the Fed created
three new facilities to lend to financial institutions: the Term
Auction Facility (TAF),31 the Term Securities Lending Facility
(TSLF),32 and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).33 The
significant increase in the Fed’s balance sheet34 is attributable to
increased lending through the discount window and these newly
developed facilities.35
B. FOIA Requests and Court Decisions
In response to the vast increase in the Fed’s lending, two news
agencies submitted requests under FOIA for information regarding
the Fed’s lending practices.36 The Fed has a standard policy of
26. Id. § 201.4(b).
27. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
28. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM:
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 57 (1984).
29. Id. at 59.
30. Kara Karlson, Comment, Checks and Balances: Using the Freedom of Information Act
To Evaluate the Federal Reserve Banks, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 213, 222 (2010).
31. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Dec. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm.
32. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Mar. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm.
33. Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Federal Reserve Announces Establishment
of Primary Dealer Credit Facility (Mar. 16, 2008), available at http://www.ny.frb.org/
newsevents/news/markets/2008/rp080316.html.
34. See supra text accompanying note 4.
35. See Kathleen Vermazen Radez, Survey, The Freedom of Information Act Exemption
4: Protecting Corporate Reputation in the Post-Crash Regulatory Environment, 2010 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 632, 664-65 (describing the loan facilities and stating that they caused the
balance of outstanding loans to reach $400 billion); Alexander Sellinger, Note, Backdoor
Bailout Disclosure: Must the Federal Reserve Disclose the Identities of Its Borrowers Under the
Freedom of Information Act?, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 264 (2009) (attributing the
increase in lending to the special credit and liquidity facilities).
36. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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resisting attempts to compel disclosure.37 The Board of Directors of
the Federal Reserve System (Board) justifies this policy in part
because it claims that the Fed releases broader aggregate informa-
tion.38 The Board’s approach ultimately led to the litigation of both
media outlets’ FOIA requests.39 Bloomberg filed its first request on
April 7, 2008, requesting “[a]ll documents reflecting or concerning
the portfolio of securities ... supporting the loan extended by the
Federal Reserve in connection with the proposed acquisition of Bear
Stearns Cos. by JP Morgan Chase & Co.”40 Bloomberg filed its
second FOIA request on May 20, 2008, requesting documents
related to the loans given and collateral accepted in transactions by
the discount window, the TSLF, the TAF, and the PDCF.41 The news
outlet sought the information in order to evaluate the government’s
response and “[t]o discharge its obligation as the eyes and ears of
the public.”42 After failing to receive a formal response to the re-
quest, Bloomberg filed its complaint in federal court on November
7, 2008.43
Fox Business submitted its initial FOIA request on November 10,
2008, seeking “the names of institutions receiving Federal Reserve
lending” and “an accounting of the collateral provided by these
37. See Sellinger, supra note 35, at 264-68 (describing the difficulties associated with
obtaining records from the Fed); see also Timothy A. Canova, Black Swans and Black
Elephants in Plain Sight: An Empirical Review of Central Bank Independence, 14 CHAP. L.
REV. 237, 308 (2011) (“The Fed has never disclosed the identities of borrowers of its discount
window lending since the program was created in 1914.”). 
38. See Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F. Supp.
2d 384, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
39. The Dodd-Frank Act has changed the Fed’s disclosure mandates to require the timely
disclosure of the information discussed later in this Note. See infra text accompanying notes
40-45; see also Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1103, 124 Stat. 1376, 2118-20 (2010). This change does
not affect the litigation in question. Because piecemeal statutory changes are an inadequate
solution to the problems that Exemption 4 poses, see infra Part V, the factual predicate
discussed in this Note still presents an ideal opportunity to adjust the current doctrine. 
40. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Declaration of Allison M. Thro ¶ 5, Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d 262
(No. 08 Civ. 9595) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
41. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 17-18, Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp.
2d 262 (No. 08 Civ. 9595), 2008 WL 8066871, at *5-6. 
42. Id. ¶¶ 2, 4.
43. Id. ¶¶ 22-26.
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institutions in exchange for the lending.”44 Fox Business submitted
a second FOIA request eight days later on November 18, 2008,
requesting similar documents for the months of September and
October 2008 and also requesting “records showing (a) the amounts
borrowed by each named institution, (b) the collateral pledged by
each institution, and (c) the collateral held by the Federal Reserve
at the close of business on November 14, 2008.”45 Fox Business did
not receive a response from the Fed regarding its first FOIA request
and received a denial in response to the second request.46
In the course of litigation of both cases in the district courts, the
Fed asserted that all responsive records were exempt pursuant to
Exemptions 4 and 5 of FOIA.47 Significantly, the Fed asserted that
Exemption 4 allowed the agency to withhold responsive records
under a “third prong” of National Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.
Morton,48 the case that established the standards for withholdings
under Exemption 4.49 The Fed asserted that “exemption [4] also
protects a governmental interest in administrative efficiency and
effectiveness.”50 The Fed claimed that disclosure of the requested
information would impair
(i) the Board’s ability to carry out its statutory responsibility “to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable
prices, and moderate long-term interest rates” specified in
section 2A of the Federal Reserve Act ... 12 U.S.C. § 225a; (ii) its
ability effectively to utilize its authority under section 13(3) of
44. Complaint ¶¶ 17-18, Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 639 F. Supp. 2d 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 272), 2009 WL 78133, at *5-6
[hereinafter Fox Complaint].
45. Id. ¶¶ 22-24.
46. Id. ¶¶ 21, 31.
47. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Bloomberg, 649 F. Supp. 2d 262 (No. 08 Civ. 9595), 2009 WL 6800709,
at *6-7 [hereinafter Fed Memorandum]; accord Fox Complaint, supra note 44, ¶¶ 31-32
(describing the denial letter from the Fed). This Note does not discuss the applicability of
Exemption 5 to the responsive records.
48. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
49. Fed Memorandum, supra note 47, at *23-30; see also Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 766-67;
infra Part III.A. 
50. Fed Memorandum, supra note 47, at *23-24 (quoting Critical Mass Energy Project v.
NRC (Critical Mass III), 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc)). The Fed also claimed
that the records were exempt from disclosure under the second prong of National Parks,
claiming competitive harm to the borrowers. Id. at *18-23.
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the FRA to permit lending by the Reserve Banks to individuals,
partnerships or corporations to address “unusual and exigent
circumstances” in the domestic economy; and (iii) and [sic] its
ability under section 10B and related sections of the FRA to
utilize [discount window] and TAF lending by the Reserve Banks
as a safety valve.51
Essentially, the Fed argued that disclosure of the identities of
borrowing institutions would subject the institutions to stigmatiza-
tion and would discourage institutions from using the Fed as a
lender of last resort.52 This would, in turn, impair the Fed’s ability
to maintain “the basic stability of the payment system by supplying
liquidity during times of systemic stress.”53
After considering the Fed’s reasoning, the Fox News and
Bloomberg district courts came to opposite conclusions as to the ap-
plicability of this program effectiveness analysis. The district court
in Fox News recognized that courts have applied the exemption “if
disclosure would undermine the agency’s ‘effective execution of its
statutory responsibilities,’”54 and noted that in this case, “[t]he
Board’s concerns, that rumors are likely to begin and runs on banks
are likely to develop, cannot be dismissed.... The national economy
is not so out of danger ... as to make the Board’s concern aca-
demic.”55 The court fully credited the Board’s argument regarding
the Fed’s statutory duties56 and held that FOIA allowed nondis-
closure on this basis.57 The Bloomberg court, on the other hand,
reached the opposite result, stating that “[i]n light of the strong
presumption in favor of interpreting FOIA exemptions narrowly ...
this Court will not import or apply the program effectiveness test.”58
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals needed to resolve the split
that had developed organically within the lower courts and did so by
51. Id. at *26.
52. Id. at *19, 29-30.
53. Id. at *29-30.
54. Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 639 F. Supp.
2d 384, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
55. Id. at 401.
56. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
57. Fox News, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 401-02.
58. Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262, 278
n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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deciding appeals of Fox News and Bloomberg on the same day.59 In
Bloomberg, the Second Circuit held that, although the arguments in
favor of the program effectiveness test were “plausible, and force-
fully made,”60 adopting the test would give the agency an inappro-
priate degree of discretion and undermine FOIA’s basic policy of
disclosure.61 The court acknowledged that it created a circuit split
with the First and D.C. Circuits by declining to adopt the program
effectiveness test.62
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Because the statute provides no guidance as to the proper
definition of “confidential,” the legislative histories of FOIA and its
exemptions are useful tools for trying to define the term through an
understanding of the underlying purposes of FOIA generally and
Exemption 4 specifically.63 Understanding FOIA’s legislative history
59. Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.
2010); Fox News Network, LLC v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 158 (2d
Cir. 2010). The Bloomberg decision contains the court’s analysis of the applicability of
Exemption 4; Fox News only references the reasoning in Bloomberg. Fox News, 601 F.3d at
160.
60. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 151.
61. Id. at 150-51.
62. Id. at 150.
63. There has been significant debate over the legitimacy of using legislative histories to
interpret statutes and the value of any information obtained in such a manner. See Antonin
Scalia, Keynote Address: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts, 98 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 305, 306 (2004) (“Congress makes its wishes known in laws; only statutes—not
committee hearings, not floor statements, not even committee reports—have the approval of
both Houses and of the president that laws require.... We must do our best to discern the
meaning of the statute from its text.”); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 379 (“[T]he benefits accruing from the use of
legislative history are marginal when weighed against the potential for abuse and the
enormous effort involved.”). But see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in
Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (“Legislative history helps a court
understand the context and purpose of a statute.”); Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s
Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380, 386 (stating that judges “cannot afford to ignore those
obvious tools which members of Congress use to explain what they are doing and the meaning
of the words used in the statute”); see also CHARLES H. KOCH ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 665-66 (6th ed. 2010) (acknowledging this divide). 
The views in favor of a disciplined use of legislative history must prevail in the present
situation. The word “confidential” is defined as “private” or “secret.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 261 (11th ed. 2003). This plain meaning of confidentiality cannot be
reconciled with courts’ rejection of agencies’ ability to invoke Exemption 4 based on an express
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is particularly important to understanding Exemption 4, as most
courts faced with this question have turned to the legislative history
for guidance64 despite the fact that a court once described the Act’s
legislative history as “tortured, not to say obfuscating.”65 
President Lyndon Johnson signed FOIA into law on July 4, 1966,
following an effort spearheaded by media outlets and with the
public support of Congress and the executive branch.66 The general
purpose of FOIA is, quite simply, to vindicate the public interest in
knowing what the government is doing.67 However, a significant
amount of information that the government holds sheds light not on
the actions of the government but rather on the actions of third
parties who interact with the government. Congress recognized that
such information often merits protection and incorporated exemp-
tions to this effect.68 
Records of congressional hearings show that Congress was aware
that a problem area lay “in the large body of the Government’s
information involving private business data.”69 The Department of
Justice expressed its view that disclosure of commercial or financial
information could cause competitive injury to third parties, impair
voluntary reporting programs, and “impede or wholly obstruct the
proper performance of necessary government[ ] functions.”70
Congress intended Exemption 4 to “protect the confidentiality of
information which is obtained by the Government ... but which
would customarily not be released to the public by the person from
whom it was obtained.”71 The Senate Report states specifically that
grant of confidentiality. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. As such, understanding
the term in its statutory context is preferable to some other, more arbitrary, alternative. 
64. See infra Part III.
65. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1978).
66. See Patricia M. Wald, The Freedom of Information Act: A Short Case Study in the
Perils and Paybacks of Legislating Democratic Values, 33 EMORY L.J. 649, 650-52 (1984)
(describing the context of the passage of FOIA and the push for “open government”).
67. 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.1 (4th ed. 2002).
68. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
69. Freedom of Information: Hearings on S. 1666 and S. 1663 (in Part) Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Practice & Procedure of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 199
(1963) (statement of Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Dep’t of
Justice).
70. Id. at 200.
71. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965). The House Report uses similar language but has a
number of clauses that seem to favor nondisclosure. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966),
reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2426-29. The House considered the bill after the Senate
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Exemption 4’s protections “would include any commercial ... and
financial data, submitted by ... a borrower to a lending agency in
connection with any loan.”72 
Although the Senate framed the language in the report in terms
that seek to protect information based on the third party’s policies
and expectations regarding the release of the information, nothing
in the report limits the purposes for which someone may invoke the
exemption. Congressional discussions regarding the potential effects
on government information gathering and competitive harm to third
parties made their way into neither the Senate Report nor the final
law.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF EXEMPTION 4 LEGAL DOCTRINE
A. National Parks and the Narrow Test for Confidentiality
As a threshold measure, Exemption 4 applies only to “information
which is (a) commercial or financial, (b) obtained from a person, and
(c) privileged or confidential.”73 The first two elements of the
threshold test are much clearer than the third.74 Analysis of the
development of Exemption 4 jurisprudence regarding the meaning
of “confidential” necessarily begins with National Parks &
Conservation Ass’n v. Morton.75 National Parks dealt with a FOIA
request by an environmental interest group seeking records from
the Department of the Interior regarding concessions operated
committee had made its report and the Senate had passed the bill. Rather than put the
restrictions on disclosure into the bill, the House committee wrote the restrictions into the
committee report and passed the bill without amendment, depriving the Senate of the
opportunity to comment on the House Report. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 5:3 (2d ed. 1978). The House Report is considered unreliable to the extent it
differs from the Senate Report. See U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 366
(1976) (“[W]e too ‘choose to rely upon the Senate Report’ in this regard.” (quoting Vaughn v.
Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1975))).
72. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9.
73. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (quoting Consumers Union of the
U.S., Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y 1969)).
74. Although the question of whether information generated by the Federal Reserve
Banks themselves can be considered “obtained from a person” was also an issue in the Second
Circuit cases, see Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143,
148-49 (2d Cir. 2010), this question is immaterial to this Note’s discussion of the third prong.
75. 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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within the national parks.76 The National Parks court stated that,
although past decisions relied upon the “which would customarily
not be released” language of the Act’s legislative history, the
subjective intent or expectations of the submitting party could not
be determinative.77 Indeed, courts had rejected earlier tests that had
relied upon either a promise of confidentiality or an expectation of
confidentiality because they provided the submitting party with
undue discretion.78 The court reasoned that the legislative purpose
underlying the exemption must objectively justify nondisclosure.79
To vindicate the legislative purpose, the court adopted a two-
pronged test, now known as the National Parks test, to determine
confidentiality under Exemption 4. The court held that:
commercial or financial matter is “confidential” for the purposes
of [Exemption 4] if disclosure of the information is likely to have
either of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government’s
ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to
cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information was obtained.80
Significantly, the court expressed no opinion as to whether other
governmental interests are embodied in this exemption, specifically
referencing program effectiveness.81
The test developed by the D.C. Circuit became widely used
throughout other circuits. Although commentators have criticized
the holding as being “fabricated, out of whole cloth,”82 seven circuits
have adopted it, and no circuit has expressly rejected it.83 
76. Id. at 766.
77. Id. at 766-67.
78. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1382, at 16-21 (1978) (discussing various approaches courts took
to define confidentiality prior to National Parks).
79. Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 766-67.
80. Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
81. Id. at 770 n.17. When the case came back to the court of appeals for a second time, the
court acknowledged that it had left this question open but declined to resolve it. See Nat’l
Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 678 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
82. John C. Janka, Comment, Federal Disclosure Statutes and the Fifth Amendment: The
New Status of Trade Secrets, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 334, 364 (1987). 
83.  Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc) (surveying the adoption
of the National Parks test by other circuits).
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B. 9 to 5 and Critical Mass Embrace a Broader View of        
Confidentiality
Although the D.C. Circuit declined to address the question of
whether Exemption 4 protects government interests outside of the
two enumerated in the National Parks test,84 other courts began to
develop a program effectiveness test organically. The first court to
do so was a district court in the District of Columbia.85 In Comstock
International v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, the court
held that the Export-Import Bank had established that disclosure
of certain information would damage program effectiveness by
impairing the bank’s ability to promote exports, thus making it
more difficult to negotiate loan arrangements and discouraging
participation in the bank’s programs.86 
Other courts found this logic persuasive, and the program effec-
tiveness test prospered. In 9 to 5 Organization for Women Office
Workers v. Board of Directors of the Federal Reserve System, the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit developed an influential
version of the program effectiveness test.87 In that case, the First
Circuit considered a FOIA request for records relating to the
Federal Reserve Bank’s participation in a confidential salary
survey.88 The Board argued that participation in the salary survey,
which required the nondisclosure of the inputs or results of the
survey, was necessary to ensure competitive compensation in
accordance with regulations promulgated to fulfill the statutory
duty of setting employee salaries.89 The court held that “[i]n view of
the legitimate government interest of efficient operation, it would
do violence to the statutory purpose of exemption 4 were the
Government to be disadvantaged by disclosing information which
serves a valuable purpose and is useful for the effective execution of
its statutory responsibilities.”90 The court specifically referenced
Comstock in rejecting the two prongs of the National Parks test as
84. See supra text accompanying note 80.
85. Comstock Int’l (U.S.A.) v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 464 F. Supp. 804 (D.D.C.
1979).
86. See id. at 808.
87. 721 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 1.
89. Id. at 10.
90. Id. at 11.
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exclusive.91 Notably, on the issue of what qualifies as a “valuable
purpose,” the court stated that it found no justification in the
legislative history for the argument that commercial or financial
information must be absolutely essential to the operations of the
agency in order to be treated as confidential.92
The D.C. Circuit adopted the program effectiveness test in
Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.93
In this case, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a FOIA request by a nuclear
power watchdog group seeking reports prepared by a utility
industry consortium.94 The court accepted the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission’s argument that although it could obtain the informa-
tion in other ways, meaning that the agency could not satisfy the
first prong of the National Parks test, using alternative methods
would significantly reduce agency efficiency.95 The court remanded
to the district court with directions to “afford the agency the
opportunity to show ... that exercising its full authority under this
regulation would damage some identifiable agency interest relating
to program effectiveness or efficiency.”96 Specifically, the agency had
to demonstrate that obtaining this information in another way
would impair “efficient operation[s]” or “effective execution of
[NRC’s] statutory responsibilities.”97 National Parks received
additional negative treatment when the case came to the court of
appeals for the second time.98 
Although Critical Mass III eventually reversed the Critical Mass
I decision, the Critical Mass III court, sitting en banc, recognized
91. Id. at 9. Even the dissent acknowledged that the National Parks test was not an
exclusive formulation of the interests that Exemption 4 protects. Id. at 12 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
92. Id. at 10 (majority opinion).
93. Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Critical Mass I), 830
F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (en banc).
94. Id. at 279. Critical Mass II and Critical Mass III dealt with the same litigation as the
issue repeatedly returned to the court of appeals. See Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 872;
Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n (Critical Mass II), 931 F.2d 939,
940, 947-48 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
95. Critical Mass I, 830 F.2d at 286.
96. Id. at 287.
97. Id. (quoting 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Dirs. of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1983)).
98. See Critical Mass II, 931 F.2d at 947-48 (Randolph, J., concurring) (opining that
National Parks incorrectly interpreted Exemption 4).
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that the Critical Mass I court applied Exemption 4 protection to
the governmental interest in administrative efficiency and effec-
tiveness.99 The court continued on to state clearly that the two
interests identified in the National Parks test are not exclusive.100
The Critical Mass III court held that the National Parks test is
overly narrow and adopted a new test that distinguished between
information that a third party voluntarily provides and information
that an agency compels.101 When a person gives information to the
agency voluntarily, the information is confidential if it is “of a kind
that would customarily not be released to the public by the person
from whom it was obtained.”102
C. Exemption 4 in the Second Circuit
The Second Circuit adopted the two-pronged National Parks test
in Continental Stock Transfer and Trust Co. v. SEC.103 The district
court in Bloomberg relied heavily on Continental Stock in determin-
ing that the program effectiveness test was not the law of the
Second Circuit.104 In Continental Stock, the Second Circuit simply
adopted the law of the D.C. Circuit without engaging in an inde-
pendent review of legislative history or purpose, stating that
“opinions [of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit] construing the Freedom of Information Act are entitled to
appropriate weight.”105 The fact that the court delivered its opinion
99. Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d at 879.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Cont’l Stock Transfer & Trust Co. v. SEC, 566 F.2d 373, 375 (2d Cir. 1977) (per
curiam). Continental Stock cites to Charles River Park “A,” Inc. v. Department of Housing &
Urban Development, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), which in turn quotes National Parks for
the formulation of the Exemption 4 test. Cont’l Stock, 566 F.2d at 375 (citing Charles River,
519 F.2d at 940). 
104. See Bloomberg L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 649 F. Supp. 2d 262,
278 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Sellinger, supra note 35, at 310 (citing Continental Stock for the
proposition that “‘[p]rogram effectiveness’ is certainly not the law of the Second Circuit”).
105. Cont’l Stock, 566 F.2d at 375. The court referred to the “appropriate weight” accorded
to the D.C. Circuit’s FOIA decisions because the D.C. Circuit’s universal jurisdiction over
FOIA complaints, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2006), results in that circuit hearing the largest
number of cases and developing the most sophisticated doctrine. See also Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Special Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 779,
779-86 (2002) (discussing the important roles of the D.C. Circuit in administrative law
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from the bench immediately following oral argument and published
the decision ex post only at the request of the SEC suggests that the
court did not see its decision as having significant precedential
value.106 Additionally, as Continental Stock was a case of a reverse-
FOIA plaintiff contesting the decision of the SEC to disclose
information, the facts of the case did not present the court with the
issue of program effectiveness.107
Between the Continental Stock and Bloomberg decisions, the
Second Circuit did not hear a case that required it to decide whether
the National Parks test represented the exclusive interests pro-
tected by Exemption 4. In American Airlines, Inc. v. National
Mediation Board, the Second Circuit recognized criticism of the
restrictiveness of the National Parks test.108 However, because the
government clearly had the ability to compel the information at
issue, and the information was exempt under the second prong of
National Parks, the court did not have to reach the question.109
Despite the lack of clarity from the court of appeals, the district
courts in the Second Circuit have given the program effectiveness
approach positive treatment.110 In Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v.
Small Business Administration, for example, the Small Business
Administration, citing to Comstock, argued that disclosure would
hamper its ability to effectively operate its loan assistance pro-
gram.111 Although the district court ruled against the agency, it did
so based on its finding on summary judgment that disclosure would
not in fact have had a negative impact on program effectiveness.112
In another case, a different district court cited 9 to 5 with approval,
stating that the defendants had “submitted extensive [documents]
that explain why disclosure ... would interfere with the export
decision making generally); G. Branch Taylor, Comment, The Critical Mass Decision: A
Dangerous Blow to Exemption 4 Litigation, 2 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 133, 139 (1994)
(recognizing the importance of the D.C. Circuit in the development of FOIA doctrine).
106. Cont’l Stock, 566 F.2d at 374.
107. Id. at 374-75.
108. 588 F.2d 863, 871 (2d Cir. 1978).
109. Id.
110. But see N.Y. Pub. Interest Research Grp. v. EPA, 249 F. Supp. 2d 327, 334-36
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (recognizing the split between National Parks/Continental Stock and Critical
Mass III but expressing the opinion that the Critical Mass III interpretation was too broad).
111. 666 F. Supp. 467, 470 (W.D.N.Y. 1987).
112. Id. at 471.
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control system.”113 In one of the most in-depth discussions of the
program effectiveness test, the Southern District of New York heard
a case involving the potential disclosure of information obtained by
the FDIC acting in its capacity as a receiver.114 The district court
held that “the peril to the FDIC’s mission here as receiver is suf-
ficiently compelling to merit use of the exemption.”115 The court
acknowledged that allowing “program effectiveness” to justify
nondisclosure could threaten the general policy of openness and
disclosure, but the court ultimately rejected this argument, claiming
that the district court had the power to hold the agency to more
than “ritual and unsubstantiated incantations.”116 On appeal, the
Second Circuit declined to reach the issue of the program effective-
ness test, stating that “[b]ecause we agree with the district court’s
analysis as to [the] second prong, we do not reach the issue whether
the district court properly afforded relief to the FDIC on the basis
of the ‘program effectiveness’ exemption derived from footnote
seventeen of National Parks.”117 
Although the legal precedent for the program effectiveness test in
the Second Circuit is admittedly sparse, this approach, and the
cases from other circuits developing it, has received positive treat-
ment.118 Furthermore, decisions prior to Bloomberg certainly did not
reject the program effectiveness approach. Before Bloomberg, the
Second Circuit had not decided any cases that forced it to confront
the issue directly. Considering that the Continental Stock court
based its adoption of National Parks on deference to the D.C.
Circuit, rather than on its own independent policy analysis,119 the
court would not have brought itself into conflict with prior circuit
decisions had it decided to embrace a broader view of confidentiality
and adopt the program effectiveness test.
113. Africa Fund v. Mosbacher, No. 92-289, 1993 WL 183736, at *6-7 & n.3 (S.D.N.Y. May
26, 1993).
114. Nadler v. FDIC, 899 F. Supp. 158, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
115. Id. at 162.
116. Id.
117. Nadler v. FDIC, 92 F.3d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1996).
118. See, e.g., Clarke v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 84-1873, 1986 WL 1234, at *3 (E.D.
Pa. Jan. 28, 1986) (rejecting FOIA request under Exemption 4 where disclosure of information
regarding the sale of U.S. treasuries “would threaten to eliminate or reduce the pool of
investors willing to purchase Government Securities”); Radez, supra note 35, at 647-48 &
n.56.
119. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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IV. TRANSPARENCY AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION: IS DISCLOSURE
ALWAYS GOOD?
A. Program Effectiveness Versus Public Interest
Although the Second Circuit could have adopted the program
effectiveness test, it chose not to, stating that doing so would be
contrary to “the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the
dominant policy objective of FOIA.”120 The court was correct in its
recognition that FOIA exemptions “have been consistently given a
narrow compass,”121 but this does not mean that courts should read
the exemptions out of the law or that courts must choose the
narrower of two interpretations when both law and policy support
the broader interpretation.
In determining that program effectiveness would give the agen-
cies too much deference, the Bloomberg court relied heavily on its
conclusion that the program effectiveness test would be analogous
to the “public interest” standard that the Supreme Court previously
rejected.122 On closer inspection, however, the two doctrines are not
as similar as their names may have led the court to believe.123 The
Bloomberg court was the first court to compare the program effec-
tiveness test with the “public interest” standard, and the only com-
mentator to address the comparison agreed with the court’s
analogy.124 Because the Bloomberg court found the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Merrill to be “instructive,”125 if this analogy is false it
120. Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 151 (2d
Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
121. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989).
122. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 150 (citing Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. of the Fed. Reserve Sys.
v. Merrill, 443 U.S. 340, 354 (1979)); see also Carroll, supra note 15, at 27-30 (endorsing the
Second Circuit’s analogy to Merrill).
123. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition at 15-16, Clearing House Ass’n v.
Bloomberg L.P., No. 10-543 (U.S. Feb. 18, 2011) (“The court of appeals mistakenly concluded
that the program effectiveness test was the ‘functional equivalent’ of the ‘public interest’
standard for withholding under Exemption 5, which [the Supreme Court] rejected.”).
124. See Carroll, supra note 15, at 27-30.
125. Bloomberg, 601 F.3d at 150 (stating additionally that the program effectiveness test
is the “functional equivalent” of the “public interest” standard).
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would weaken the logic on which the court based its rejection of the
program effectiveness test. 
Merrill dealt not with Exemption 4 but with FOIA Exemption 5,126
which applies to “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law to a party ... in litigation
with the agency.”127 The guiding principles of Exemption 5 doctrine
are the “privilege[s] enjoyed by the Government in the civil discov-
ery context.”128 In Merrill, the Fed did not argue that withholding
records in the public interest is a privilege enjoyed by the agency in
civil discovery, and it probably could not have made a nonfrivolous
argument to that effect. The Fed argued in Merrill that “[t]his
general authority exists ... even if the memoranda in question could
be routinely discovered by a party in civil litigation with the
agency.”129 The Fed’s argument clearly conflicts with the plain
meaning of Exemption 5, because “public interest” is not relevant to
civil discovery.130 Confidentiality, however, has a direct relationship
to program effectiveness insofar as confidentiality promotes partic-
ipation in or the operation of government programs.131 
The Bloomberg court misconstrued the rationale for the Supreme
Court’s rejection of the “public interest” standard. The “public
interest” standard failed not because of its breadth but because of
its incompatibility with the statutory language. The Supreme Court
did say that the “public interest” standard “proves too much” and
“would leave little, if anything, to FOIA’s requirement of prompt
disclosure”;132 however, the Bloomberg court’s analogy fails to take
into account the vastly different scopes of the exemptions in ques-
tion. The “public interest” test would “allow an agency to withhold
any memoranda, even those that contain final opinions and state-
ments of policy.”133 The program effectiveness test would apply only
once the threshold test is satisfied,134 meaning that only commercial
or financial information obtained from a person would qualify. As
126. Merrill, 443 U.S. at 350-52.
127. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (2006) (emphasis added).
128. Merrill, 443 U.S. at 354.
129. Id. at 353.
130. See id. at 354.
131. See supra Part III.B; supra notes 68, 70 and accompanying text.
132. Merrill, 443 U.S. at 354. 
133. Id.
134. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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courts have rejected the argument that Exemption 4 covers
confidential noncommercial information,135 the threshold test
significantly limits the scope of the exemption. Considering that the
purpose of FOIA is to inform the citizenry of the actions of the
government,136 the “public interest” test rejected in Merrill does
significantly more to undermine this goal than does the program
effectiveness test.
B. Treating Financial Information Differently Under FOIA
Even if the analogy between the “public interest” test and the
program effectiveness test is appropriate, legitimate policy justifica-
tions support treating the disclosure of financial information dif-
ferently than the disclosure of other agency records. A blanket policy
in favor of disclosure is able to produce generally consistent and
predictable results and create a higher degree of transparency.
However, such a policy fails to account for the costs and benefits of
transparency, which change relative to the government process in
question.137 The impact of a broad-based policy of transparency on
the use of Exemption 4 has increased under the current administra-
tion.138
Justice Scalia once called FOIA “the Taj Mahal of the Doctrine of
Unanticipated Consequences, the Sistine Chapel of Cost-Benefit
Analysis Ignored.”139 One of the primary causes for failures in cost-
benefit analysis in the application of FOIA is a lack of clear
understanding of what transparency means and when it is most
important.140 The benefits of transparency are well known and
“fairly commonsensical” because they are “consistent with modern
135. See Wash. Project, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 244-45
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
136. See PIERCE, supra note 67, § 5.1.
137. See Carroll, supra note 15, at 30-31 (citing Cary Coglianese, The Transparency
President? The Obama Administration and Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 530
(2009)).
138. See Oliya S. Zamaray, Note, The Obama Administration’s Blanket FOIA Policy Is No
Comfort to Federal Contractors: The Need for Executive Branch Guidance on Exemption 4
Within the “Openness Regime,” 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 617, 621-23 (2010) (discussing the effect
of executive policy on FOIA disclosure).
139. Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, 6 REGULATION 14,
15 (1982).
140. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 885 (2006).
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Western political values.”141 Yet transparency also has distinct costs,
such as national security, the fiscal cost of compliance, the impair-
ment of deliberative government action, and the inability of the
government to control the information it produces.142
These costs can be particularly acute in the case of the potential
disclosure of commercial and financial information. One commenta-
tor has noted that such third-party information is “not the stuff that
comprises the heart of democratic self-rule.”143 Transparency is no
better defined in the context of banking and financial services than
it is in other areas of government.144 The inability of an agency such
as the Fed—charged with increasing market confidence, acting as
a lender of last resort, and preventing bank runs—to control the
flow of the information it holds can have potentially serious negative
consequences.145 Some unresolved issues regarding transparency in
bank supervision include fairness and access to market information,
market stigma and competitive harm, government role as a poten-
tial market mover, and concerns regarding the public’s ability to
digest complex financial information in a way that promotes the
benefits of transparency.146 Until policymakers have an opportunity
to further examine these issues, it is imprudent to dismiss the Fed’s
claims of impaired program effectiveness. Transparency is a means
to an end rather than an end in and of itself, and the blanket policy
in favor of disclosure deprives courts of the ability to use transpar-
ency as a means to an end.
Although disclosure of the records at issue in Bloomberg will
undoubtedly shed light on the actions of the Fed, it also threatens
to disclose a significant amount of information about the banks that
transacted with the Fed.147 Disclosure of these private records does
not achieve FOIA’s goal of openness and government transpar-
141. Id. at 894; see also Wald, supra note 66, at 679 (asking “whether any alternative ...
defense against a secretive and capricious Executive is as effective as an informed citizenry”).
142. See Fenster, supra note 140, at 906-10.
143. Amy E. Rees, Note, Recent Developments Regarding the Freedom of Information Act:
A “Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, Perhaps Both,” 44 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1187 (1995)
(arguing that Exemption 1 should be construed more narrowly than Exemption 4).
144. See James E. Kelly, Transparency and Bank Supervision, 73 ALB. L. REV. 421, 421-25
(2010).
145. See Fed Memorandum, supra note 47, § D(1)(b).
146. Kelly, supra note 144, at 446.
147. See supra Part I.B.
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ency.148 In fact, the disclosure of sensitive business information has
long been a perceived problem of FOIA, despite the protection of
Exemption 4.149 The National Parks test fails to take into account
numerous reasons why businesses would desire to keep information
secret outside the limited scope of competitive harm.150 National
Parks also fails to protect businesses from corporate espionage in
situations in which information would be useful to a competitor but
would render competitive harm difficult or impossible to prove.151
These economic costs must be considered in deciding whether the
costs of disclosure are sufficient to overcome FOIA’s presumption in
favor of transparency. 
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The circuit split created by the Second Circuit’s rejection of the
program effectiveness test shows the lack of clarity regarding the
proper scope of Exemption 4. Although the Dodd-Frank Act has
changed some disclosure requirements,152 the legislation did not
affect the vast majority of financial and commercial information
held by the government. Congress’s lack of specialization and insti-
tutional inertia make such an ad hoc approach to defining “confiden-
tial” impractical. Considering that Congress made the changes that
it did only in response to financial crisis, the legislature cannot be
expected to make legislative policy determinations regarding each
type of commercial or financial information in the government’s
possession. Such an approach would be a completely inefficient use
of congressional resources. Courts need a more workable test, and
they are the institution best positioned to create one.
148. See Gary I. Kruger, Comment, A Review of the Fourth Exemption of the Freedom of
Information Act, 9 AKRON L. REV. 673, 694 (1976).
149. See Russell B. Stevenson, Jr., Protecting Business Secrets Under the Freedom of
Information Act: Managing Exemption 4, 34 ADMIN. L. REV. 207, 222 (1982).
150. See, e.g., Radez, supra note 35, at 663-73 (discussing the interest in preventing
reputational harm).
151. See Thomas L. Patten & Kenneth W. Weinstein, Disclosure of Business Secrets Under
the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 195-200 (1977).
152. See supra note 39.
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The broader view of confidentiality embraced by the First and
D.C. Circuits153 is appropriate in light of FOIA’s legislative history154
and is preferable to the narrow view as a matter of policy.155 In this
respect, this Note breaks from existing commentary that has largely
argued that the program effectiveness test is impermissibly broad.156
In a modified version of the test developed by the First Circuit,157
agencies should be entitled to invoke Exemption 4 when the value
of disclosure is outweighed by the information’s utility as a tool for
the effective execution of the agency’s statutory responsibilities.
Although this proposed solution invites courts to engage in a
balancing analysis, it should not change the way courts have used
the program effectiveness test in the past. Making the balancing
test explicit would simply encourage courts to engage in the type of
principled cost-benefit analysis necessary for any proper transpar-
ency analysis.158
This proposed test’s workability is one of its primary advantages.
The record of use from twenty years of application in the First and
D.C. Circuits159 undermines the contentions that the program
effectiveness test gives impermissible deference to the agencies.160
District courts have demonstrated that they can properly hold the
agency to a meaningful burden of proof.161 Additionally, many cir-
cuits have not considered the applicability of the program effective-
ness test, meaning that its adoption would not create significant
conflicts with existing precedent.162 Further, district courts in other
circuits have given the program effectiveness test positive treat-
153. See supra Part III.B.
154. See supra Part II.
155. See supra Parts III.A, IV.B.
156. See, e.g., Sellinger, supra note 35, at 309-15; Carroll, supra note 15, at 26-29. 
157. See supra text accompanying note 90.
158. See supra Part IV.B.
159. See supra Part III.B.
160. See Bloomberg, L.P. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 601 F.3d 143, 150
(2d Cir. 2010).
161. See Nadler v. FDIC, 899 F. Supp. 158, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Buffalo Evening News, Inc.
v. Small Bus. Admin., 666 F. Supp. 467, 470-71 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (rejecting an agency’s
contention of impaired program effectiveness based on the inadequacy of its declarations).
162. See Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 356 F.3d 588, 597 (4th Cir. 2004); Utah
v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 256 F.3d 967, 969 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001); Frazee v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 97 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).
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ment.163 The Supreme Court has recognized workability as an
important objective of FOIA policy and has encouraged the develop-
ment of categorical rules to achieve this goal.164
Additionally, courts should use the program effectiveness test to
supplement the National Parks test, not supplant it. Despite the
many criticisms of National Parks and the fact that agencies are ill-
equipped to handle claims of confidentiality properly,165 the
National Parks test has proved workable. Indeed, in Critical Mass
III, the D.C. Circuit reexamined the National Parks test and
determined that none of the arguments against the test “justifie[d]
the abandonment of so well an established precedent.”166 
The program effectiveness test would work essentially as a third
prong of the National Parks test. In formulating the first prong of
the National Parks test, the court found that the exemption served
the government’s interest in efficient operation,167 but the test
encompasses this interest only to the extent that the efficiency of
agency operations depends on the cooperation of individuals in the
submission of information. As the cases developing the program
effectiveness doctrine show, an agency’s efficiency can be severely
hampered without an impairment of its ability to obtain information
in the future.168 Unlike with third-party claims of confidentiality,
agencies should be able to adequately recognize and articulate
specific threats that disclosure poses to their own performance of
their statutory duties.
Many examples in which an agency’s ability to perform its stat-
utory duties may be impaired involve participation in voluntary
agency programs. Bloomberg, for example, dealt with program
163. See Envtl. Tech., Inc. v. EPA, 822 F. Supp. 1226, 1229 (E.D. Va. 1993); Clarke v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Treasury, No. 84-1973, 1986 WL 1234, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 1986).
164. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
779 (1989).
165. See David C. Vladeck, Information Access—Surveying the Current Legal Landscape
of Federal Right-To-Know Laws, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1787, 1793 (2008).
166. Critical Mass III, 975 F.2d 871, 875-77 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Critical Mass II, 931
F.2d 939, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Randolph, J., concurring) (arguing against the reversal of
National Parks based on the principle of stare decisis). But see Richard L. Rainey, Stare
Decisis and Statutory Interpretation: An Argument for a Complete Overruling of the National
Parks Test, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1430, 1460-73 (1993) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit gave
undue weight to stare decisis and should have overruled National Parks).
167. Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
168. See supra Part III.B-C; sources cited supra note 163.
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effectiveness in the context of participation in the Fed’s emergency
lending programs.169 With respect to such programs, the agency is
not concerned with its ability to gather information through ques-
tionnaires and investigations and, as such, often cannot meet the
first prong of the National Parks test. However, a real threat
remains that persons will not participate in agency programs out of
fear that courts might compel the agency to disclose information it
obtains from participants. 
In order to protect the interests of such persons, another commen-
tator has proposed incorporating specific protections against rep-
utational harm.170 This approach is understandable, as fear of
reputational harm would have been a primary cause of future
nonparticipation in the Fed’s lending programs. Fear of reputational
harm, however, is not the only reason that disclosure of commercial
or financial information might impair an agency’s ability to perform
its statutory duties. For example, in 9 to 5, the case that introduced
the program effectiveness test, disclosure would have impaired the
Board’s ability to participate in an employer survey that was nec-
essary to set employee salaries.171 No one contended that disclosure
would have caused any reputational harm, yet the agency’s ability
to perform its duties would have been impaired. Similarly, in Nadler
v. FDIC, the FDIC acted as a receiver for a failed bank.172 Because
the bank had failed, harm to its reputation was not an issue.
Nevertheless, the disclosure of commercial and financial informa-
tion would have significantly impaired the FDIC’s receivership
program, which “aims to maximize profits on the assets acquired
from failed banks.”173 
As these examples show, adding protection for only reputational
harm addresses a limited subset of situations and fails to take into
account the various other ways in which disclosure of commercial or
financial information obtained from third parties might impair an
agency’s ability to perform its statutory duties. There is no reason
that FOIA exemptions should protect against fear of reputational
harm but not other causes of impairment. For this reason, the
169. See supra Part I.A.
170. See Radez, supra note 35, at 673-84.
171. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
172. 899 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); see supra text accompanying note 114.
173. Nadler, 899 F. Supp. at 162-63.
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program effectiveness test is preferable to specific protection against
reputational harm. 
Another potential counterargument concerns the scope of the
program effectiveness test. One might contend that, because the
program effectiveness test seeks to withhold information based on
the impact of disclosure on the agency’s effective execution of its
programs, information that might fall under this prong is actually
more relevant to the people’s interest in their government’s activ-
ities than information that falls under the two prongs of National
Parks. In Bloomberg, the news outlets made precisely this argument
by claiming that their FOIA requests would serve to inform the
public as to the actions of the Fed during the financial crisis.174
However, as Exemption 4 applies to only commercial or financial
information obtained from a person,175 the program effectiveness
test would only bar requesters from obtaining qualifying third-party
information. Any information generated by the government would
not qualify. The program effectiveness test would merely give an
additional justification for agencies to withhold the private informa-
tion that they obtain from persons with whom they transact.
CONCLUSION
Although the Dodd-Frank Act has addressed the specific con-
tested information,176 the recent litigation in the Second Circuit
highlights the need for a general reevaluation of Exemption 4
protection.177 Congress does not have the ability to legislate the dis-
closure requirements for all the information held by all agencies.178
The National Parks test currently used in the Second Circuit fails
to adequately protect the legitimate private and governmental
interests that Congress intended to protect when it enacted
Exemption 4. When taken as an exclusive view of Exemption 4’s
scope, the two-pronged test is too narrow. Because the two-pronged
test only protects one government interest and one private interest,
it fails to account for the huge number of instances in which both
174. See supra text accompanying note 42.
175. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006).
176. See supra Part V.
177. See supra Part III.C.
178. See supra Part V.
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the agency and the private party would want the information
withheld. Businesses or individuals that interact with the govern-
ment take the risk that a court might compel the disclosure of their
private financial information.179 By linking disclosure requirements
to the effect of disclosure on the agency’s ability to perform its stat-
utory duties, the program effectiveness test incentivizes participa-
tion in all types of government programs. Individuals who would not
otherwise participate in government programs for fear of a FOIA
request exposing their participation would receive increased pro-
tection. The Fed’s lending during the financial crisis provides just
one example of how anonymous participation in government
programs can be beneficial, both for the participants and for the
public.
Samuel L. Zimmerman*
179. See supra Part IV.B.
* J.D. Candidate 2012, William & Mary School of Law; A.B. 2009, Brown University. 
Many thanks to my parents and family for all their love and support, and to the Law Review
editors and staff for their help and effort in the publication of this Note. 
